by Ali A. Allawi
Library Journal
: Following the deposing of Saddam Hussein, Allawi returned to Iraq after years of exile and served as minister of trade for the Interim Governing Council and as minister of finance in the Transitional Government (2003–2006). His insider account of the transition in Iraq paints the American plan and its leadership in a thoroughly unfavorable light. Allawi is critical first of the American planners for their lack of understanding of Iraqi culture, the abysmal state of the economy after years of sanctions, and their failure to consider rifts within the larger Islamic culture. Then he condemns the implementation, as the leaders insisted on sticking to a time line that disregarded changing circumstances. Thoughtful and well documented, Allawi's interpretations markedly differ from public statements made by the American leadership as well as the take offered in My Year in Iraq by Paul Bremer, the first leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The extensive detail and the generally gloomy tone may deter casual browsers, but the book is recommended for thoughtful followers of the news.—Marcia L. Sprules, Council on Foreign Relations Lib., New York Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Distributed by Syndetic Solutions Inc. Terms
Publishers Weekly
: Allawi, until recently a senior minister in the Iraqi government, provides an insider's account of the nascent Iraqi government following the American invasion. His scholarly yet immensely readable exposition of Iraqi society and politics will likely become the standard reference on post-9/11 Iraq. It convincingly blasts the Coalition Provisional Authority for failing to understand the simmering sectarian animosity and conflicting loyalties that led Iraq into chaos. Beginning during Saddam's reign, among the motley gang of liberal democrats, Islamists and Kurdish nationalists that formed the opposition-in-exile, of which Allawi was a prominent member, he chronicles the fortunes and aspirations of the political parties, personalities and interest groups that now are tearing Iraq apart. In one representative episode, after the siege of Fallujah in 2004, the Marines initiated an ill-fated attempt to create a Fallujah Brigade of local men who would be loyal to the CPA. "[Head of the CPA L. Paul] Bremer... learned about it from newspaper reports.... The defense minister [Allawi himself] went on television, denouncing the Fallujah Brigade.... The 'Fallujah Brigade,' after a few weeks of apparent cooperation with the Marines, began to act as the core of a national liberation army. Any pretense that they were rooting out insurgents was dropped." (Apr. 9) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Distributed by Syndetic Solutions Inc. Terms
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